AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
2012
Tractable subsets of first-order logic are a central topic in AI research. Several of these formalisms have been used as the basis for first-order probabilistic languages. Howev...
AMAI
2008
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2008
Springer
We provide a description of generalized default logic as a unified formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning. Special attention will be paid to the role of the monotonic logic underlyi...
AAAI
1990
13 years 5 months ago
1990
This paper provides an account of the representation of defaults in Cyc and their semantics in terms of first order logic with reification. Default reasoning is a complex thing, a...
AAAI
1990
13 years 5 months ago
1990
Recently, conditional logics have been developed for application to problems in default reasoning. We present a uniform framework for the development and investigation of conditio...
IJCAI
1993
13 years 5 months ago
1993
We describe a new approach to default reasoning, based on a principle of indi erence among possible worlds. We interpret default rules as extreme statistical statements, thus obta...
AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
Recently, Lakemeyer and Levesque proposed a logic of onlyknowing which precisely captures three forms of nonmonotonic reasoning: Moore's Autoepistemic Logic, Konolige's ...
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
We propose a framework that brings together two major forms of default reasoning in Artificial Intelligence: applying default property classification rules in static domains, and d...
FLAIRS
2008
13 years 7 months ago
2008
It is well-known that default reasoning and preference-based decision making both make use of preferential relations between possible worlds resp. alternatives. In this paper, we ...
SIGLEX
1991
13 years 8 months ago
1991
Explaining how the meaning of words relate to the meaning of the utterance in which they are used is of utmost importance. The most common approaches view the meaning of an uttera...
KR
1989
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
1989
Springer
In this paper I argue that we do not understand the process of default reasoning. A number of examples are given which serve to distinguish di erent default reasoning systems. It ...