SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We consider the problem of query rewrites in the context of keyword advertisement. Given a three-layer graph consisting of queries, query rewrites, and the corresponding ads that ...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
Online peer production systems have enabled people to coactively create, share, classify, and rate content on an unprecedented scale. This paper describes strong macroscopic regul...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG paymen...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
