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WINE
2010
Springer
274views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
Exploiting Myopic Learning
Mohamed Mostagir
WINE
2010
Springer
152views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
Collusion in VCG Path Procurement Auctions
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
Yoram Bachrach, Peter Key, Morteza Zadimoghaddam
WINE
2010
Springer
164views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
Incentives in Online Auctions via Linear Programming
Online auctions in which items are sold in an online fashion with little knowledge about future bids are common in the internet environment. We study here a problem in which an auc...
Niv Buchbinder, Kamal Jain, Mohit Singh
WINE
2010
Springer
135views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
Market Communication in Production Economies
We study the information content of equilibrium prices using the market communication model of Deng, Papadimitriou, and Safra [4]. We show that, in the worst case, communicating an...
Christopher A. Wilkens
WINE
2010
Springer
124views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
A Novel Approach to Propagating Distrust
Trust propagation is a fundamental topic of study in the theory and practice of ranking and recommendation systems on networks. The Page Rank [9] algorithm ranks web pages by propa...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Adam Tauman K...
WINE
2010
Springer
168views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competit...
Elias Koutsoupias, George Pierrakos
WINE
2010
Springer
148views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks
In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making a decision based on the preferences of multiple parties (agents), while taking into account that agents may behave stra...
Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchfo...
WINE
2010
Springer
129views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
Optimal Pricing in the Presence of Local Network Effects
We study the optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist selling a divisible good (service) to consumers that are embedded in a social network. A key feature of our model is that c...
Ozan Candogan, Kostas Bimpikis, Asuman E. Ozdaglar
WINE
2010
Springer
153views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
Approximation Schemes for Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential postedpricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K copi...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Y...
WINE
2010
Springer
154views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games
Abstract. We study safety level coalitions in competitive games. Given a normal form game, we define a corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of ...
Yoram Bachrach, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jenni...
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