WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
In addition to useful Economic interpretation, auction based algorithms are generally found to be efficient. In this note, we observe that the auction-based mechanism can also be u...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
We present a characterization of empirical price data from sponsored search auctions. We show that simple models drawing bid values independently from a fixed distribution can be...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
Abstract. In this work, we consider singleton congestion games as a special class of (weighted) congestion games where each players' strategy consists only of a single resourc...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
Abstract. We propose an extensive-form game as a model for pricing roaming charges in 802.11 wireless data networks. We specify utility functions for the three agents involved in t...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
We study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid rules. We analyze this scenario from the seller’s perspective and con...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
We consider a model of content contribution in peer-to-peer networks with linear quadratic payoffs and very general interaction patterns. We find that Nash equilibria of this gam...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
We study equilibrium computation for exchange markets. We show that the market equilibrium of either of the following two markets:
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
In this paper, we study competitive markets - a market is competitive if increasing the endowment of any one buyer does not increase the equilibrium utility of any other buyer. In ...