EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
In the model of perfectly secure message transmission schemes (PSMTs), there are n channels between a sender and a receiver. An infinitely powerful adversary A may corrupt (observe...
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
Recently, Aumann and Lindell introduced a new realistic security model for secure computation, namely, security against covert adversaries. The main motivation was to obtain secure...
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
We introduce a new notion called -isolated proofs of knowledge ( -IPoK). These are proofs of knowledge where a cheating prover is allowed to exchange up to bits of communication wi...
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
Abstract. In this paper we prove that the sponge construction introduced in [4] is indifferentiable from a random oracle when being used with a random transformation or a random pe...
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
This paper proves "tight security in the random-oracle model relative to factorization" for the lowest-cost signature systems available today: every hash-generic signatur...
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
EUROCRYPT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
Consider an abstract storage device (G) that can hold a single element x from a fixed, publicly known finite group G. Storage is private in the sense that an adversary does not hav...