Sciweavers

CORR
2008
Springer
154views Education» more  CORR 2008»
13 years 4 months ago
On Pure and (approximate) Strong Equilibria of Facility Location Games
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where n selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed...
Thomas Dueholm Hansen, Orestis Telelis
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
92views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/a fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: a=O(log n) for the fo...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vaziran...