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CORR
2008
Springer
154views Education» more  CORR 2008»
13 years 9 months ago
On Pure and (approximate) Strong Equilibria of Facility Location Games
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where n selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed...
Thomas Dueholm Hansen, Orestis Telelis
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
92views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 2 months ago
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/a fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: a=O(log n) for the fo...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vaziran...