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SAGT
2015
Springer
35views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
Algorithmic Signaling of Features in Auction Design
In many markets, products are highly complex with an extremely large set of features. In advertising auctions, for example, an impression, i.e., a viewer on a web page, has numerou...
Shaddin Dughmi, Nicole Immorlica, Ryan O'Donnell, ...
SAGT
2015
Springer
14views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
Settling Some Open Problems on 2-Player Symmetric Nash Equilibria
Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod
SAGT
2015
Springer
18views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
Cost-Sharing Models in Participatory Sensing
In Smart City and Participatory Sensing initiatives the key concept is for user communities to contribute sensor information and form a body of knowledge that can be exploited by i...
Georgios Birmpas, Costas Courcoubetis, Ioannis Gio...
SAGT
2015
Springer
29views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
Cost-Sharing Scheduling Games on Restricted Unrelated Machines
We study a very general cost-sharing scheduling game. An instance consists of k jobs and m machines and an arbitrary weighed bipartite graph denoting the job strategies. An edge co...
Guy Avni, Tami Tamir
SAGT
2015
Springer
28views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods
Abstract. We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods using the leading notion of fairness in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two...
Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Mil...
SAGT
2015
Springer
36views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
When Can Limited Randomness Be Used in Repeated Games?
Pavel Hubácek, Moni Naor, Jonathan Ullman
SAGT
2015
Springer
27views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
Commitment in First-Price Auctions
Yunjian Xu, Katrina Ligett
SAGT
2015
Springer
27views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters
Abstract. We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, also have secondary preferences, ...
Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obrazts...
SAGT
2015
Springer
34views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
"Beat-Your-Rival" Routing Games
In the traditional setting of routing games, the standard assumption is that selfish agents are unconcerned with the performance of their competitors in the network. We propose an...
Gideon Blocq, Ariel Orda
SAGT
2015
Springer
24views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2015»
3 years 3 months ago
The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage...
Shant Boodaghians, Adrian Vetta
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