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SAGA
2007
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Probabilistic Techniques in Algorithmic Game Theory
We consider applications of probabilistic techniques in the framework of algorithmic game theory. We focus on three distinct case studies: (i) The exploitation of the probabilistic...
Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis
SAGT
2009
Springer
131views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles
Abstract. We continue the recently initiated study of the computational aspects of weak saddles, an ordinal set-valued solution concept proposed by Shapley. Brandt et al. gave a po...
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Jan ...
SAGT
2009
Springer
118views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
SAGT
2009
Springer
338views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
Computational Aspects of Equilibria
Mihalis Yannakakis
SAGT
2009
Springer
102views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
Abstract. This paper studies a setting where a principal needs to motivate teams of agents whose efforts lead to an outcome that stochastically depends on the combination of agent...
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
SAGT
2009
Springer
308views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
Partition Equilibrium
Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz
SAGT
2009
Springer
122views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
A New Derandomization of Auctions
Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b ∈ [h]n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, ...
Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz
SAGT
2009
Springer
192views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm
SAGT
2009
Springer
112views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games
Abstract. In game theory, a player’s action is said to be weakly dominated if there exists another action that, with respect to what the other players do, is never worse and some...
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul...
SAGT
2009
Springer
176views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 10 months ago
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction,...
Po-An Chen, David Kempe