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ATAL
2010
Springer
8 years 5 months ago
Pure Nash equilibria: complete characterization of hard and easy graphical games
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
Albert Xin Jiang, MohammadAli Safari
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
134views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
8 years 9 months ago
Correlated equilibria in graphical games
We examine correlated equilibria in the recently introduced formalism of graphical games, a succinct representation for multiplayer games. We establish a natural and powerful rela...
Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Lui...
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
184views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
8 years 10 months ago
Computing pure nash equilibria in graphical games via markov random fields
We present a reduction from graphical games to Markov random fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Our result, wh...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
119views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
8 years 10 months ago
Nash equilibria in graphical games on trees revisited
Graphical games have been proposed as a game-theoretic model of large-scale distributed networks of non-cooperative agents. When the number of players is large, and the underlying...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
CSCLP
2007
Springer
8 years 10 months ago
A Comparison of the Notions of Optimality in Soft Constraints and Graphical Games
The notion of optimality naturally arises in many areas of applied mathematics and computer science concerned with decision making. Here we consider this notion in the context of ...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent V...
ICALP
2009
Springer
9 years 4 months ago
On a Network Generalization of the Minmax Theorem
We consider graphical games in which edges are zero-sum games between the endpoints/players; the payoff of a player is the sum of the payoffs from each incident edge. We give a si...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou
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