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CORR
2002
Springer
159views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 3 months ago
Complexity of Mechanism Design
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism de...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
158views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
13 years 8 months ago
Mechanisms for coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...
Cuihong Li, Uday Rajan, Shuchi Chawla, Katia Sycar...
ATAL
2005
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
FOCS
2008
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron...