Sciweavers

UAI
2004
13 years 5 months ago
Regret Minimizing Equilibria and Mechanisms for Games with Strict Type Uncertainty
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is n...
Nathanael Hyafil, Craig Boutilier
SODA
2008
ACM
109views Algorithms» more  SODA 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
Auctions for structured procurement
This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartlin...
IJCAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
Incremental Mechanism Design
Mechanism design has traditionally focused almost exclusively on the design of truthful mechanisms.
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
ESA
2008
Springer
124views Algorithms» more  ESA 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
A truthful mechanism consists of an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment function which guarantees that the "players" cannot improve their utilities by "chea...
Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Evolutionary dynamics for designing multi-period auctions
Mechanism design (MD) has recently become a very popular approach in the design of distributed systems of autonomous agents. A key assumption required for the application of MD is...
Tomas Klos, Gerrit Jan van Ahee
AAAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
Partial Revelation Automated Mechanism Design
In most mechanism design settings, optimal general-purpose mechanisms are not known. Thus the automated design of mechanisms tailored to specific instances of a decision scenario...
Nathanael Hyafil, Craig Boutilier

Presentation
366views
13 years 8 months ago
Novel Mechanisms for Allocation of Heterogeneous Objects to Strategic Agents
This talk was part of my PhD colloquium at Dept of CSA, IISc, Bangalore.
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Computational mechanism design for multi-sensor information fusion
Conventional information fusion architectures are challenged by developments in sensor networks that allow individually-owned (and thereby selfish) sensors to interact and share d...
Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings...

Presentation
390views
13 years 9 months ago
Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money
This was presentation given by James Zou at AAAI 2010. (Slides are created by him)