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CORR
2010
Springer
135views Education» more  CORR 2010»
9 years 3 months ago
Bounded Rationality, Strategy Simplification, and Equilibrium
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that player...
Hubie Chen
AAMAS
2007
Springer
9 years 4 months ago
Reaching pareto-optimality in prisoner's dilemma using conditional joint action learning
We consider a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game where two independent learning agents play against each other. We assume that the players can observe each others’ action but ar...
Dipyaman Banerjee, Sandip Sen
AAAI
2010
9 years 4 months ago
Beyond Equilibrium: Predicting Human Behavior in Normal-Form Games
It is standard in multiagent settings to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies. However, studies in experimental economics demonstrate that Nash equilibrium is...
James R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown
UAI
2000
9 years 5 months ago
Nash Convergence of Gradient Dynamics in General-Sum Games
Multi-agent games are becoming an increasingly prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerceand auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing...
Satinder P. Singh, Michael J. Kearns, Yishay Manso...
AAAI
2006
9 years 5 months ago
Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets
Significant work has been done on computational aspects of solving games under various solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, correlated eq...
Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm
NIPS
2007
9 years 5 months ago
Regret Minimization in Games with Incomplete Information
Extensive games are a powerful model of multiagent decision-making scenarios with incomplete information. Finding a Nash equilibrium for very large instances of these games has re...
Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, Michael H. Bow...
IJCAI
2007
9 years 5 months ago
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Strictly Competitive Multiagent Scenarios
This paper is a comparative study of game-theoretic solution concepts in strictly competitive multiagent scenarios, as commonly encountered in the context of parlor games, competi...
Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, ...
AAAI
2010
9 years 5 months ago
Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts
We consider risk-sensitive generalizations of Nash and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. We prove that, except for a class of degenerate games, unless a two-player ga...
Mickey Brautbar, Michael Kearns, Umar Syed
APPROX
2010
Springer
207views Algorithms» more  APPROX 2010»
9 years 5 months ago
Exploiting Concavity in Bimatrix Games: New Polynomially Tractable Subclasses
Abstract. We study the fundamental problem of computing an arbitrary Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games. We start by proposing a novel characterization of the set of Nash equilibri...
Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis
ESA
2008
Springer
148views Algorithms» more  ESA 2008»
9 years 5 months ago
Selfish Bin Packing
Following recent interest in the study of computer science problems in a game theoretic setting, we consider the well known bin packing problem where the items are controlled by se...
Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman
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