PODC
2010
ACM
13 years 8 months ago
2010
ACM
We quantify the effect of Bayesian ignorance by comparing the social cost obtained in a Bayesian game by agents with local views to the expected social cost of agents having glob...
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
We present a domain model and protocol for the exchange of recommendations by selfish agents without the aid of any centralized control. Our model captures a subset of the realiti...
AAIM
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
ISAAC
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish ag...
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
We are interested in domains where an agent repeatedly negotiates with other agents over shared resources where the demand or utility to the agent for the shared resources vary ov...