CORR
2012
Springer
12 years 8 days ago
2012
Springer
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, ...
ICALP
2011
Springer
12 years 8 months ago
2011
Springer
Abstract. Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the ...
CDC
2010
IEEE
12 years 11 months ago
2010
IEEE
Game theory is emerging as a popular tool for distributed control of multiagent systems. In order to take advantage of these game theoretic tools the interactions of the autonomous...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
IMC
2010
ACM
13 years 2 months ago
2010
ACM
Cost control for the Internet access providers (AP) influences not only the nominal speeds offered to the customers, but also other, more controversial, policies related to traffi...
ETM
2010
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Three service providers in competition, try to optimize their quality of service / content level and their service access price. But, they have to deal with uncertainty on the cons...
ECAI
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
Abstract. Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a c...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...