SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
Often, we wish to design incentive-compatible algorithms for settings in which the players' private information is drawn from discrete domains (e.g., integer values). Our mai...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
One attractive feature of market scoring rules [Hanson '03] is that they are myopically strategyproof: It is optimal for a trader to report her true belief about the likeliho...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
Trust between a pair of users is an important piece of information for users in an online community (such as electronic commerce websites and product review websites) where users ...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based onl...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. New buyers arrive on the market probabilistically, and are each...