SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
There is significant experimental evidence that prediction markets are efficient mechanisms for aggregating information and are more accurate in forecasting events than tradition...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
Consider a group of individuals in a strategic environment with moral hazard and adverse selection, and suppose that providing incentives for a given outcome requires a monitor to...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting Random Sampling Optimal Price auction (RSOP) has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline and Wright; this leads to a truth...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems with externalities (i.e., in systems where the performance of one coalition may be affected by other ...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
We study protocols to enable one user (the principal) to make potentially profitable but risky interactions with another user (the agent), in the absence of direct trust between ...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
We study the relationship between the social cost of correlated equilibria and the social cost of Nash equilibria. In contrast to previous work focusing on the possible benefits ...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...