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AAAI
2012
7 years 15 days ago
On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions
We consider the problem of selecting fair divisions of a heterogeneous divisible good among a set of agents. Recent work (Cohler et al., AAAI 2011) focused on designing algorithms...
Steven J. Brams, Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jami...
CORR
2011
Springer
153views Education» more  CORR 2011»
8 years 1 months ago
On the Windfall and Price of Friendship: Inoculation Strategies on Social Networks
This article investigates selfish behavior in games where players are embedded in a social context. A framework is presented which allows us to measure the Windfall of Friendship...
Dominic Meier, Yvonne Anne Pignolet, Stefan Schmid...
AI
2002
Springer
8 years 10 months ago
Using similarity criteria to make issue trade-offs in automated negotiations
Automated negotiation is a key form of interaction in systems that are composed of multiple autonomous agents. The aim of such interactions is to reach agreements through an itera...
Peyman Faratin, Carles Sierra, Nicholas R. Jenning...
JSAC
2006
99views more  JSAC 2006»
8 years 10 months ago
Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems
We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private pre...
Costas Courcoubetis, Richard R. Weber
JAIR
2006
118views more  JAIR 2006»
8 years 10 months ago
Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources
A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory s t...
Ulrich Endriss, Nicolas Maudet, Fariba Sadri, Fran...
CN
2007
111views more  CN 2007»
8 years 10 months ago
An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...
CORR
2010
Springer
90views Education» more  CORR 2010»
8 years 10 months ago
Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
ATAL
2010
Springer
8 years 11 months ago
Internal implementation
We introduce a constrained mechanism design setting called internal implementation, in which the mechanism designer is explicitly modeled as a player in the game of interest. This...
Ashton Anderson, Yoav Shoham, Alon Altman
ICMAS
2000
8 years 11 months ago
Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts--i.e., contracts where each party ca...
Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou
AAAI
1998
8 years 11 months ago
Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding, i.e., impossible to breach. Such contracts do not allow the agent...
Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm
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