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WINE
2009
Springer
128views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
9 years 5 months ago
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
Abstract. We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [2] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions and for public project problems, and in each case so...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis
WINE
2009
Springer
140views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
9 years 5 months ago
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games
In one dimensional facility games, public facilities are placed based on the reported locations of the agents, where all the locations of agents and facilities are on a real line. ...
Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou
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