Sciweavers

SP
2009
IEEE
114views Security Privacy» more  SP 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Formally Certifying the Security of Digital Signature Schemes
We present two machine-checked proofs of the existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks of the Full Domain Hash signature scheme. These proofs formalize the ...
Santiago Zanella Béguelin, Gilles Barthe, B...
SP
2009
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Prospex: Protocol Specification Extraction
Paolo Milani Comparetti, Gilbert Wondracek, Christ...
SP
2009
IEEE
101views Security Privacy» more  SP 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Noninterference for a Practical DIFC-Based Operating System
The Flume system is an implementation of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) at the operating system level. Prior work has shown Flume can be implemented as a practical ...
Maxwell N. Krohn, Eran Tromer
SP
2009
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format
Sphinx is a cryptographic message format used to relay anonymized messages within a mix network. It is more compact than any comparable scheme, and supports a full set of security...
George Danezis, Ian Goldberg
SP
2009
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Privacy Weaknesses in Biometric Sketches
The increasing use of biometrics has given rise to new privacy concerns. Biometric encryption systems have been proposed in order to alleviate such concerns: rather than comparing...
Koen Simoens, Pim Tuyls, Bart Preneel
SP
2009
IEEE
128views Security Privacy» more  SP 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Quantifying Information Leaks in Outbound Web Traffic
As the Internet grows and network bandwidth continues to increase, administrators are faced with the task of keeping confidential information from leaving their networks. Today’...
Kevin Borders, Atul Prakash
SP
2009
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
The Mastermind Attack on Genomic Data
In this paper, we study the degree to which a genomic string, Q, leaks details about itself any time it engages in comparison protocols with a genomic querier, Bob, even if those ...
Michael T. Goodrich
SP
2009
IEEE
143views Security Privacy» more  SP 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors
—This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how mo...
Bart Coppens, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Koen De Bosscher...
SP
2009
IEEE
144views Security Privacy» more  SP 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
De-anonymizing Social Networks
Operators of online social networks are increasingly sharing potentially sensitive information about users and their relationships with advertisers, application developers, and da...
Arvind Narayanan, Vitaly Shmatikov