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SIAMDM
2011
9 years 8 months ago
Stable Roommates Matchings, Mirror Posets, Median Graphs, and the Local/Global Median Phenomenon in Stable Matchings
For stable marriage (SM) and solvable stable roommates (SR) instances, it is known that there are stable matchings that assign each participant to his or her (lower/upper) median ...
Christine T. Cheng, Anhua Lin
DAM
2002
96views more  DAM 2002»
10 years 1 months ago
The structure of stable marriage with indifference
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in their preference lists (i.e., each list can be partially ordered). We prove tha...
David Manlove
TCS
2008
10 years 1 months ago
A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
The hospitals/residents (HR) problem is a many-to-one generalization of the stable marriage (SM) problem. Researchers have been interested in variants of stable matchings that eit...
Christine Cheng, Eric McDermid, Ichiro Suzuki
JDA
2008
101views more  JDA 2008»
10 years 1 months ago
Student-Project Allocation with preferences over Projects
We study the problem of allocating students to projects, where both students and lecturers have preferences over projects, and both projects and lecturers have capacities. In this...
David Manlove, Gregg O'Malley
JCO
2008
102views more  JCO 2008»
10 years 1 months ago
Stable matching problems with exchange restrictions
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement for a stable matching, namely that there should not be two participants who wou...
Robert W. Irving
COCOON
2003
Springer
10 years 6 months ago
Randomized Approximation of the Stable Marriage Problem
Abstract. While the original stable marriage problem requires all participants to rank all members of the opposite sex in a strict order, two natural variations are to allow for in...
Magnús M. Halldórsson, Kazuo Iwama, ...
SAGT
2009
Springer
155views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
10 years 8 months ago
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings
We consider the loss in social welfare caused by individual rationality in matching scenarios. We give both theoretical and experimental results comparing stable matchings with soc...
Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das, Yonatan Naamad
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