WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We introduce a new solution concept for games, near-strong equilibrium, a variation of strong equilibrium. Previous work has shown the existence of 2-strong pure strategy equilibr...
AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
Providing agents with strategies that will be robust against deviations by coalitions is central to the design of multi-agent agents. However, such strategies, captured by the not...
SODA
2007
ACM
13 years 6 months ago
2007
ACM
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst c...
DAGSTUHL
2007
13 years 6 months ago
2007
Following recent interest in the strong price of anarchy (SPOA), we consider this measure, as well as the well known price of anarchy (POA) for the job scheduling problem on two u...
WINE
2009
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2009
Springer
This paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. ...
ICALP
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...