Sciweavers

Share
warning: Creating default object from empty value in /var/www/modules/taxonomy/taxonomy.module on line 1416.
ICDE
2011
IEEE
217views Database» more  ICDE 2011»
10 years 12 months ago
T-verifier: Verifying truthfulness of fact statements
— The Web has become the most popular place for people to acquire information. Unfortunately, it is widely recognized that the Web contains a significant amount of untruthful inf...
Xian Li, Weiyi Meng, Clement T. Yu
JAIR
2007
113views more  JAIR 2007»
11 years 8 months ago
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a res...
Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
131views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
11 years 8 months ago
Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
Aaron Archer, Robert Kleinberg
LATIN
2010
Springer
11 years 10 months ago
Randomized Truthful Algorithms for Scheduling Selfish Tasks on Parallel Machines
We study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in or...
Eric Angel, Evripidis Bampis, Nicolas Thibault
ALDT
2009
Springer
126views Algorithms» more  ALDT 2009»
12 years 6 days ago
On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to players having additive utility functions over the items. We consider allocations in which no player envies the bun...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiot...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
164views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
12 years 1 months ago
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Sl...
STACS
2004
Springer
12 years 1 months ago
Deterministic Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Related Machines
Abstract. We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents and provide the first deterministic mechanisms with constant approximation that a...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
169views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
12 years 1 months ago
Online auctions with re-usable goods
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mo...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
12 years 1 months ago
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
IWSEC
2007
Springer
12 years 2 months ago
Privacy-Preserving Eigentaste-Based Collaborative Filtering
With the evolution of e-commerce, privacy is becoming a major concern. Many e-companies employ collaborative filtering (CF) techniques to increase their sales by providing truthfu...
Ibrahim Yakut, Huseyin Polat
books