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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
155views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 4 months ago
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
SAGT
2009
Springer
177views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations
We study implementability in dominant strategies of social choice functions when sets of types are multi-dimensional and convex, sets of outcomes are arbitrary, valuations for outc...
André Berger, Rudolf Müller, Seyed Hos...