ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
PODC
2004
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2004
ACM
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
We study the problem of how to allocate m identical items among n > m agents, assuming each agent desires exactly one item and has a private value for consuming the item. We as...
SAGT
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...