JAIR
2010
13 years 3 months ago
2010
We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multiunit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appro...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG paymen...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...