ORL
2006
13 years 4 months ago
2006
This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions--the Vickr...
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
CIA
2001
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2001
Springer
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation, task assignment and last but not leas...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...