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WINE
2010
Springer
109views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
11 years 11 months ago
Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences
In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure, and the voters' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
103views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
12 years 1 months ago
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
EOR
2007
79views more  EOR 2007»
12 years 1 months ago
Consensus reaching in committees
In this paper, we apply a consensus model to decision-making in committees that have to choose one or more alternatives from a set of alternatives. The model does not use a voting...
Patrik Eklund, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Harrie C. M. ...
ATAL
2010
Springer
12 years 2 months ago
Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators
In this paper, we study a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach to preference aggregation and voting when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure, and the voter...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme ...
ATAL
2010
Springer
12 years 2 months ago
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
A voting rule is an algorithm for determining the winner in an election, and there are several approaches that have been used to justify the proposed rules. One justification is t...
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
AAAI
2008
12 years 4 months ago
Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting
One way for agents to reach a joint decision is to vote over the alternatives. In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, an agent can vote more than once without being det...
Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer
AAAI
2007
12 years 4 months ago
Strongly Decomposable Voting Rules on Multiattribute Domains
Sequential composition of voting rules, by making use of structural properties of the voters’ preferences, provide computationally economical ways for making a common decision o...
Lirong Xia, Jérôme Lang, Mingsheng Yi...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
147views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
12 years 6 months ago
Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule
In 1876 Charles Lutwidge Dodgson suggested the intriguing voting rule that today bears his name. Although Dodgson’s rule is one of the most well-studied voting rules, it suffers...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Ka...
TARK
2007
Springer
12 years 7 months ago
Vote manipulation in the presence of multiple sincere ballots
A classical result in voting theory, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, states that for any non-dictatorial voting rule for choosing between three or more candidates, there will b...
Ulle Endriss
ATAL
2007
Springer
12 years 8 months ago
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Recent results have established that a variety of voting rules are computationally hard to manipulate in the worst-case; this arguably provides some guarantee of resistance to man...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
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