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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
138views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
8 years 3 months ago
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based onl...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
CORR
2010
Springer
116views Education» more  CORR 2010»
8 years 3 months ago
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is...
Toby Walsh
CLIMA
2010
8 years 3 months ago
Is Computational Complexity a Barrier to Manipulation?
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballo...
Toby Walsh
ECAI
2010
Springer
8 years 4 months ago
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences....
Toby Walsh
IJCAI
2007
8 years 4 months ago
Winner Determination in Sequential Majority Voting
Voting rules map collections of preference orderings over a set of candidates (one for each voter) to candidates. Now, in many contexts, we have to consider the case where either t...
Jérôme Lang, Maria Silvia Pini, Franc...
DAGSTUHL
2007
8 years 4 months ago
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules
A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of total orders (aka. votes) over a fixed set of alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. A voti...
Vincent Conitzer
AAAI
2010
8 years 4 months ago
Good Rationalizations of Voting Rules
The concept of distance rationalizability allows one to define new voting rules or "rationalize" existing ones via a consensus class of elections and a distance. A conse...
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
AAAI
2010
8 years 4 months ago
Can Approximation Circumvent Gibbard-Satterthwaite?
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts that any reasonable voting rule cannot be strategyproof. A large body of research in AI deals with circumventing this theorem via computa...
Ariel D. Procaccia
AAAI
2010
8 years 4 months ago
Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes
We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
AAAI
2010
8 years 4 months ago
Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication
In cooperative multiagent systems an alternative that maximizes the social welfare--the sum of utilities--can only be selected if each agent reports its full utility function. Thi...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia
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