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AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Approximation Algorithms and Mechanism Design for Minimax Approval Voting
We consider approval voting elections in which each voter votes for a (possibly empty) set of candidates and the outcome consists of a set of k candidates for some parameter k, e....
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, Evangelos...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
AAAI
2008
13 years 6 months ago
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alterna...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
105views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Communication complexity of common voting rules
We determine the communication complexity of the common voting rules. The rules (sorted by their communication complexity from low to high) are plurality, plurality with runoff, ...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
On the robustness of preference aggregation in noisy environments
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by communicating faulty preferences. We investigate this setting by introducing a theore...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Gal A....