This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di erent bidders arrive at di erent times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is receiv...
We investigate equilibrium strategies for bidding agents that participate in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. For this setting, previous rese...
Enrico H. Gerding, Zinovi Rabinovich, Andrew Byde,...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Auctions are an important means for purchasing material in the era of e-commerce. Research on auctions often studies them in isolation. In practice, however, auction agents are pa...
In this paper, we investigate a model of a combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction, in which each sales item is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer...