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SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
15 years 5 months ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
WWW
2007
ACM
15 years 11 months ago
Improving the Performance of Online Auctions Through Server-side Activity-based Caching
Online auction sites have very specific workloads and user behavior characteristics. Previous studies on workload characterization conducted by the authors showed that i) bidding a...
Daniel A. Menascé, Vasudeva Akula
SODA
2010
ACM
201views Algorithms» more  SODA 2010»
15 years 8 months ago
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
WINE
2009
Springer
194views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
15 years 5 months ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi
AMEC
2004
Springer
15 years 4 months ago
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments
Abstract. In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items....
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm