The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Online auction sites have very specific workloads and user behavior characteristics. Previous studies on workload characterization conducted by the authors showed that i) bidding a...
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Abstract. In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items....