We study keyword auctions in a model where each advertiser has a value for every slot, which is not necessarily proportional to the number of clicks the advertiser expects to rece...
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
We propose an expressive auction design that allows advertisers to specify the kinds of demographics and websites they wish to target within an advertising network. The design all...
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...
Existing reputation systems used by online auction houses do not address the concern of a buyer shopping for commodities—finding a good bargain. These systems do not provide in...
Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu, Vinod Ganapathy,...