We introduce the following consensus estimate problem. Several processors hold private and possibly different lower bounds on a value. The processors do not communicate with each ...
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
Externalities are recognized to exist in the sponsored search market, where two co-located ads compete for user attention. Existing work focuses on the effect of another ad on th...
Many commonly-used auction mechanisms are "maximal-in-range". We show that any maximalin-range mechanism for n bidders and m items cannot both approximate the social wel...
We consider the problem of online keyword advertising auctions among multiple bidders with limited budgets, and study a natural bidding heuristic in which advertisers attempt to o...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...