Abstract. Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first...
Yossi Azar, Benjamin E. Birnbaum, Anna R. Karlin, ...
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
In this paper, we consider the design of an agent that is able to autonomously make optimal bundling decisions when selling multiple heterogeneous items within existing online auc...
Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jenn...
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...