We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, a...
Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf ...
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Preference elicitation — the process of asking queries to determine parties’ preferences — is a key part of many problems in electronic commerce. For example, a shopping age...
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations fo...