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83
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ALGORITHMICA
2010
125views more  ALGORITHMICA 2010»
14 years 11 months ago
On the Fastest Vickrey Algorithm
We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, a...
Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf ...
107
Voted
EOR
2011
140views more  EOR 2011»
14 years 2 months ago
Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
122views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
15 years 4 months ago
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
Preference elicitation — the process of asking queries to determine parties’ preferences — is a key part of many problems in electronic commerce. For example, a shopping age...
Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations fo...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer