We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information s...
We present a practical protocol based on homomorphic cryptography for conducting provably fair sealed-bid auctions. The system preserves the secrecy of the bids, even after the an...
David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieb...
We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighte...
We show that the Vickrey auction, despite its theoretical benefits, is inappropriate if “antisocial” agents participate in the auction process. More specifically, an antisoc...