We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for congestion games with polynomial latency functions. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the ...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul G. S...
We study algorithmic questions concerning a basic microeconomic congestion game in which there is a single provider that offers a service to a set of potential customers. Each cus...
We consider weighted linear congestion games, and investigate how social ignorance, namely lack of information about the presence of some players, affects the inefficiency of pure...
Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kap...
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our d...
Heiner Ackermann, Petra Berenbrink, Simon Fischer,...
We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that comput...
Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. ...