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» On revenue equivalence in truthful mechanisms
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SIGECOM
2005
ACM
122views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 11 months ago
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 13 days ago
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
AMMA
2009
Springer
14 years 25 days ago
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
Maher Said
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 9 months ago
A prior-free revenue maximizing auction for secondary spectrum access
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary ...
Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li
LATIN
2010
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
The Power of Fair Pricing Mechanisms
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
Christine Chung, Katrina Ligett, Kirk Pruhs, Aaron...