136 search results - page 8 / 28 » Strong price of anarchy |
WINE
2005
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2005
Springer
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
15 years 9 months ago
2010
Tsinghua U.
: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
139
click to vote
ESA
2007
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2007
Springer
We consider the price of selfish routing in terms of tradeoffs and from an average-case perspective. Each player in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by...
WAOA
2005
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2005
Springer
We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that comput...