Computational Mechanism Design

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Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001. The focus of this chapter is on the Generalized Vickrey Auction, and combinatorial allocation problems. In particular, I consider approaches to address the computational complexity of winner determination, the valuation complexity of participation in an auction, and the communication costs of different mechanisms.

David Parkes

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Added	05 Jan 2009
Updated	05 Jan 2009
Authors	David Parkes

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