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Presentation
390views
13 years 9 months ago
Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money
This was presentation given by James Zou at AAAI 2010. (Slides are created by him)

Publication
208views
13 years 9 months ago
Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness requires the use of an arriva...
James Zou, Sujit Gujar, and David C. Parkes

Publication
216views
13 years 9 months ago
Dynamic Matching with a Fall-Back Option
We study dynamic matching without money when one side of the market is dynamic with arrivals and de- partures and the other is static and agents have strict prefer- ences over a...
Sujit Gujar, David Parkes

Publication
466views
14 years 3 months ago
Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions
In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are cur- rently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) c...
Akash Das Sarma, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari