Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation

We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with dynamically arriving requests from agents matched with each auction. Each auction is associated with some consignment of the resources from a single seller. We provide a simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting. Rather than match each buyer with a single auction, the VW mechanism allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness. Categories and Subject Descriptors F.2 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences—Economics. General Terms Algorithms, Economics.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: SIGECOM
• Authors: Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer
• Keywords: Dynamic Resource Allocation, SIGECOM 2003, Simple Virtual Worlds, Single Auction