On Evolving Fixed Pattern Strategies for Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Table 1 shows the payoff to player one. The same matrix also holds for player two. Player one can gain the maximum 5 points (T = 5) by defection if player two cooperates. However, if both players defect in the light of maximum profit, both players can only gain 1 point (P =1), which is less than 3 points (R =3) if both cooperated. This paper describes the social evolution of an environment where all individuals are repeating patterns of behaviour. The paper follows Axelrod's work [1] of computer simulations of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), which is widely regarded as a standard model for the evolution of cooperation. Previous studies by Axelrod [2], Hirshleifer and Coll [3], Lindgren [4], Fogel [5], Darwen and Yao [6] focused on strategies that are history dependent. In other words, these strategies use the outcome of the opponent's past game history in making a decision on a given move. This includes the most well-known strategy, tit-for-tat. This is an intere...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: ACSC
• Authors: Daniel Jang, Peter A. Whigham, Grant Dick
• Keywords: ACSC 2004, Iterated Prisoner Dilemma, Paper Follows Axelrod, Past Game History, Theoretical Computer Science