Efficient One-Round Key Exchange in the Standard Model

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: ACISP
• Authors: Colin Boyd, Yvonne Cliff, Juan Manuel González Nieto, Kenneth G. Paterson
• Keywords: ACISP 2008, Key Exchange Protocols, Powerful Security Model, Security Privacy, Stronger Security Guarantees