On the Social Cost of Distributed Selfish Content Replication

We study distributed content replication networks formed voluntarily by selfish autonomous users, seeking access to information objects that originate from distant servers. Each user caters to minimization of its individual access cost by replicating locally (up to constrained storage capacity) a subset of objects, and accessing the rest from the nearest possible location. We show existence of stable networks by proving existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for a game-theoretic formulation of this situation. Social (overall) cost of stable networks is measured by the average or by the maximum access cost experienced by any user. We study socially most and least expensive stable networks by means of tight bounds on the ratios of the Price of Anarchy and Stability respectively. Although in the worst case the ratios may coincide, we identify cases where they differ significantly. We comment on simulations exhibiting occurence of cost-efficient stable networks on average.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: NETWORKING
• Authors: Gerasimos G. Pollatos, Orestis Telelis, Vassilis Zissimopoulos
• Keywords: Access Cost, Computer Networks, Expensive Stable Networks, NETWORKING 2008, Stable Networks