Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms

This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof mechanism that always achieves a Pareto efficient allocation. Consequently, if false-name bids are possible, we need to sacrifice efficiency to some extent. This leaves the natural question of how much surplus must be sacrificed. To answer this question, this paper focuses on worst-case analysis. Specifically, we consider the fraction of the Pareto efficient surplus that we obtain and try to maximize this fraction in the worst-case, under the constraint of false-name-proofness. As far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to examine the worst-case efficiency of false-name-proof mechanisms. We show that the wor...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2010
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo
• Keywords: ATAL 2010, Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms, False-name-proof Mechanisms, Intelligent Agents, Worst-case Efficiency Ratio