A Proof of Revised Yahalom Protocol in the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) Model

Although the Yahalom protocol, proposed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham in 1990, is one of the most prominent key establishment protocols analyzed by researchers from the computer security community (using automated proof tools), a simplified version of the protocol is only recently proven secure by Backes and Pfitzmann (2006) in their cryptographic library framework. We present a protocol for key establishment that is closely based on the Yahalom protocol. We then present a security proof in the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) model and the random oracle model. An extension to our proposed protocol results in an unusual feature, that is session key can be renewed for subsequent communication without the server’s involvement (i.e., re-authentication). We also observe that no partnering mechanism is specified within the Yahalom protocol. We then present a brief discussion on the role and the possible construct of session identifiers as a form of partnering mechanism, which allows the ri...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2007
• Where: CJ
• Authors: Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
• Keywords: CJ 2007, Key Establishment, Session Identifiers, Yahalom Protocol