On the Value of Correlation

Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Correlated equilibrium captures the idea that in many systems there exists a trusted administrator who can recommend behavior to a set of agents, but can not enforce such behavior. This makes this solution concept most appropriate to the study of multi-agent systems in AI. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game in which the agents' welfare (expected sum of players' utilities) is greater than their welfare in all mixed-strategy equilibria. Following the idea initiated by the price of anarchy literature this suggests the study of two major measures for the value of correlation in a game with nonnegative payoffs:

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: JAIR
• Authors: Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
• Keywords: Correlated Equilibrium, Correlation Devices, JAIR 2008, Nash Equilibrium