Truthful spectrum auction design for secondary networks

Abstract—Opportunistic wireless channel access by nonlicensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. Auctions represent a natural mechanism for allocating the spectrum, generating an economic incentive for the licensed user to relinquish channels. A severe limitation of existing spectrum auction designs lies in the oversimplifying assumption that every non-licensed user is a singlenode or single-link secondary user. While such an assumption makes the auction design easier, it does not capture practical scenarios where users have multihop routing demands. For the first time in the literature, we propose to model non-licensed users as secondary networks (SNs), each of which comprises of a multihop network with end-to-end routing demands. We aim to design truthful auctions for allocating channels to SNs in a coordinated fashion that maximizes social welfare of the system. We use simple examples to show that such auctions among SNs dif...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2012
• Where: INFOCOM
• Authors: Yuefei Zhu, Baochun Li, Zongpeng Li
• Keywords: Auction Design, Communications, INFOCOM 2012, Linear Optimization, Spectrum Auction