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PODC
2012
ACM

On the price of equivocation in byzantine agreement

11 years 7 months ago
On the price of equivocation in byzantine agreement
In the Byzantine agreement problem, a set of n processors, any f of whom may be arbitrarily faulty, must reach agreement on a value proposed by one of the correct processors. It is a celebrated result that unless n > 3f, Byzantine agreement is impossible in a variety of computation and communication models. This is due to the fact that faulty processors can equivocate, that is, say different things to different processors. If this ability is mitigated, for example by assuming a global broadcast channel, then n > 2f is sufficient. With very few exceptions, the literature on Byzantine agreement has been confined to the n > 2f and n > 3f paradigms. We bridge the gap between these two paradigms by assuming partial broadcast channels among sets of three processors, observing that equivocation is fundamentally an act involving three parties: a faulty processor that lies (inconsistently) to two correct processors. We characterize the conditions under which Byzantine
Alexander Jaffe, Thomas Moscibroda, Siddhartha Sen
Added 28 Sep 2012
Updated 28 Sep 2012
Type Journal
Year 2012
Where PODC
Authors Alexander Jaffe, Thomas Moscibroda, Siddhartha Sen
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